Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis (Task 10)

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Task Overview

Background

This task considers the relative likelihood of various circuit failure modes. This added level of resolution may be a desired option for those fire scenarios that are significant contributors to the risk. The methodology provided in this document benefits from the knowledge gained from the tests performed in response to the circuit failure issue.

Purpose

Conducting a Fire PRA in accordance with this methodology necessitates an analysis of fireinduced circuit failures beyond that typically conducted during original Fire PRAs. The circuit analysis elements of the project are conducted in three distinct phases:

  1. Fire PRA cable selection (Task 3),
  2. Detailed circuit failure analysis (Task 9), and
  3. Circuit failure mode likelihood analysis (Task 10).

This task provides methods and instructions for conducting the third phase of circuit analysis – circuit failure mode likelihood analysis for Fire PRA cables. Task 10 estimates the probability of hot short cable failure modes of interest, which in turn can be correlated to specific component failure modes. As discussed in Section 3.3.2 of Volume 1, the methods and techniques for deriving circuit failure mode probability estimates are based on limited data and experience. Consequently, this area of analysis is not yet a mature technology, and undoubtedly further advances and refinements will come with time. Nonetheless, the methods and techniques presented in this chapter represent the current state of knowledge and provide a reasonable approach for establishing first-order circuit failure mode probability estimates, albeit with relatively high uncertainty tolerances.

Scope

Chapter 10 provides methods and technical considerations for assigning probability estimates to specific cable failure modes associated with fire-induced cable damage.

This task does not address the implementation of plant-specific quality assurance or configuration control requirements that might apply to a Fire PRA. Nor is it intended to validate the accuracy of plant-specific data extracted from plant drawings, documents, or databases. Each plant should follow appropriate quality assurance, administrative, and configuration control procedures applicable to the work being conducted. The need to validate input source documents should be addressed as part of assembling the prerequisite information in Step 1.

Related Element(s) of ASME/ANS PRA Standard, ASME-RA-Sb-2013

Related NUREG/CR-6850 Appendices:

Supplemental Guidance