Difference between revisions of "Plant Fire-Induced Risk Model (Task 5)"
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Fire PRAs analyze a wide variety of fire-induced scenarios, one of which is fire damage rendering the main control room (MCR) either inhabitable or ineffective. As a result of this fire damage, operators cannot stay in the MCR and the command and control of the plant is transferred from the MCR to another location. This is commonly referred to a main control room abandonment (MCRA). MCRA is analyzed as a special case of fire HRA. While NUREG-1921/EPRI 1023001 briefly addressed abandonment, additional guidance and inputs are needed to properly address the unique contexts of abandonment scenarios. | Fire PRAs analyze a wide variety of fire-induced scenarios, one of which is fire damage rendering the main control room (MCR) either inhabitable or ineffective. As a result of this fire damage, operators cannot stay in the MCR and the command and control of the plant is transferred from the MCR to another location. This is commonly referred to a main control room abandonment (MCRA). MCRA is analyzed as a special case of fire HRA. While NUREG-1921/EPRI 1023001 briefly addressed abandonment, additional guidance and inputs are needed to properly address the unique contexts of abandonment scenarios. | ||
| − | + | EPRI 3002009215 provides more detailed consideration of the elements to model for main control room abandonment, including: | |
| − | * | + | *Adding logic in the model to capture when the conditions requiring abandonment occur, whether due to a loss of control room habitability or a loss of the capability to reach a safe-and-stable state from the control room. i.e., loss of control (Page 3-2) |
| − | * | + | *Incorporating random failures of equipment required for remote shutdown |
| − | * | + | *Model logic for incorporating mitigatable fire-induced failures of equipment required for remote shutdown |
| − | * | + | *Modeling non-mitigatable fire-induced failures of equipment required for remote shutdown |
| − | + | *Model logic for capturing accident scenarios that create conditions beyond the capability of the remote shutdown equipment and/or procedures. | |
| + | Refer to Section 3 of 3002009215 for more information on modeling alternate shutdown capability in the PRA logic model. | ||
Revision as of 10:35, 6 November 2018
Contents
Task Overview
Background
This task discusses steps for the development of a logic model that reflects plant response following a fire. Specific instructions have been provided for treatment of fire-specific procedures or preplans. These procedures may impact availability of functions and components, or include fire-specific operator actions (e.g., self-induced-station-blackout).
Purpose
This section describes the procedure for developing the Fire PRA Model to calculate CDF, CCDP, LERF, and CLERP for fire events. The procedure addresses the process of implementing temporary or permanent changes to the Internal Events PRA to quantify fire-induced CDF, CCDP, LERF, and CLERP, and for developing special models to address FEPs. The procedure also addresses the transition from temporary changes to permanent changes to the Internal Events PRA Model during the development of the Fire PRA Model.
Scope
This procedure addresses the following major steps for developing the Fire PRA Model for calculating CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP for fire events.
- Step 1–Develop the Fire PRA CDF/CCDP Model.
- Step 2–Develop the Fire PRA LERF/CLERP Model.
Related Element(s) of ASME/ANS PRA Standard, ASME-RA-Sb-2013
Fire PRA Plant Response Model (PRM)
Related EPRI 1011989 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendices
None
Supplemental Guidance
EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)
Fire PRAs analyze a wide variety of fire-induced scenarios, one of which is fire damage rendering the main control room (MCR) either inhabitable or ineffective. As a result of this fire damage, operators cannot stay in the MCR and the command and control of the plant is transferred from the MCR to another location. This is commonly referred to a main control room abandonment (MCRA). MCRA is analyzed as a special case of fire HRA. While NUREG-1921/EPRI 1023001 briefly addressed abandonment, additional guidance and inputs are needed to properly address the unique contexts of abandonment scenarios.
EPRI 3002009215 provides more detailed consideration of the elements to model for main control room abandonment, including:
- Adding logic in the model to capture when the conditions requiring abandonment occur, whether due to a loss of control room habitability or a loss of the capability to reach a safe-and-stable state from the control room. i.e., loss of control (Page 3-2)
- Incorporating random failures of equipment required for remote shutdown
- Model logic for incorporating mitigatable fire-induced failures of equipment required for remote shutdown
- Modeling non-mitigatable fire-induced failures of equipment required for remote shutdown
- Model logic for capturing accident scenarios that create conditions beyond the capability of the remote shutdown equipment and/or procedures.
Refer to Section 3 of 3002009215 for more information on modeling alternate shutdown capability in the PRA logic model.
