Plant Fire-Induced Risk Model (Task 5) - Revision history

User: /* Methodology for Modeling Plant Trip Probabilities in Nuclear Power Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (EPRI 3002016053) */

2020-04-24T13:16:34Z

Methodology for Modeling Plant Trip Probabilities in Nuclear Power Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (EPRI 3002016053)

User: /* Supplemental Guidance */

2020-04-03T14:35:40Z

Supplemental Guidance

User: /* Supplemental Guidance */

2020-04-03T14:31:21Z

Supplemental Guidance

User: /* Supplemental Guidance */

2020-04-03T14:30:09Z

Supplemental Guidance

User: /* Supplemental Guidance */

2020-04-03T14:27:58Z

Supplemental Guidance

User: /* EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215) */

2020-04-03T14:25:48Z

EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)

User: /* Supplemental Guidance */

2020-04-03T14:24:17Z

Supplemental Guidance

User: /* Scope */

2020-04-03T14:16:56Z

Scope

User at 18:09, 19 March 2020

2020-03-19T18:09:08Z

User: /* Supplemental Guidance */

2018-11-26T15:48:20Z

Supplemental Guidance

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:16, 24 April 2020
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	===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/3002016053/ Methodology for Modeling Plant Trip Probabilities in Nuclear Power Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (EPRI 3002016053)]===		===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/3002016053/ Methodology for Modeling Plant Trip Probabilities in Nuclear Power Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (EPRI 3002016053)]===
−	Typically, a ~~FPRA~~ assumes a reactor trip for fire scenarios unless it can be demonstrated that no ~~FPRA~~ components are impacted and the reactor will not trip. As a result, very few ~~FPRA~~ scenarios are screened from quantification. The operating experience in the United States was reviewed and showed that only one in six events results in a plant trip, and the events are strongly correlated with a few ignition source bins mainly related to electrical distribution and the turbine generator. This report documents a methodology and screening process that can be applied to fire scenarios for ignition source bins where a plant trip is unlikely to occur. For qualifying scenarios, a 0.1 conditional trip probability can be applied.	+	Typically, a Fire PRA assumes a reactor trip for fire scenarios unless it can be demonstrated that no Fire PRA components are impacted and the reactor will not trip. As a result, very few Fire PRA scenarios are screened from quantification. The operating experience in the United States was reviewed and showed that only one in six events results in a plant trip, and the events are strongly correlated with a few ignition source bins mainly related to electrical distribution and the turbine generator. This report documents a methodology and screening process that can be applied to fire scenarios for ignition source bins where a plant trip is unlikely to occur. For qualifying scenarios, a 0.1 conditional trip probability can be applied.

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 ==Supplemental Guidance==
-With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model (see [[Fire PRA Component Selection (Task 2)|Task 2]]).
+With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model (see [[Fire PRA Component Selection (Task 2)#Supplemental Guidance|Task 2]]).
 ===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002009215/ EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)]===

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ==Supplemental Guidance==
-With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model (see [[#Fire_PRA_Component_Selection_(Task_2)|Task 2]]).
+With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model (see [[Fire PRA Component Selection (Task 2)|Task 2]]).
 ===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002009215/ EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)]===

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ==Supplemental Guidance==
-With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model.
+With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model (see [[#Fire_PRA_Component_Selection_(Task_2)|Task 2]]).
 ===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002009215/ EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)]===

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ==Supplemental Guidance==
-With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios, as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model.
+With the exception of main control room abandonment scenarios and plant trip probabilities as discussed below, the process for developing the Fire PRA logic model to calculate CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP model is largely unchanged from EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850. However, it should be acknowledged that the addition of multiple spurious operations and/or alternate shutdown in the PRA model needs careful consideration to be appropriately placed into the model.
 ===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002009215/ EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)]===
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 *Model logic for capturing accident scenarios that create conditions beyond the capability of the remote shutdown equipment and/or procedures.
 Refer to Section 3 of EPRI 3002009215 / NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 for more information on modeling alternate shutdown capability in the PRA logic model.

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 ===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002009215/ EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)]===
-Fire PRAs analyze a wide variety of fire-induced scenarios, one of which is fire damage rendering the main control room (MCR) either inhabitable or ineffective. As a result of this fire damage, operators cannot stay in the MCR and the command and control of the plant is transferred from the MCR to another location. This is commonly referred to a main control room abandonment (MCRA). MCRA is analyzed as a special case of fire HRA. While NUREG-1921/EPRI 1023001  briefly addressed abandonment, additional guidance and inputs are needed to properly address the unique contexts of abandonment scenarios.
+Fire PRAs analyze a wide variety of fire-induced scenarios, one of which is fire damage rendering the main control room (MCR) either inhabitable or ineffective. As a result of this fire damage, operators cannot stay in the MCR and the command and control of the plant is transferred from the MCR to another location. This is commonly referred to a main control room abandonment (MCRA). MCRA is analyzed as a special case of fire HRA. While NUREG-1921/EPRI 1023001 briefly addressed abandonment, additional guidance and inputs are needed to properly address the unique contexts of abandonment scenarios.
 EPRI  3002009215 / NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 provides more detailed consideration of the elements to model for main control room abandonment, including:
-*Adding logic in the model to capture when the conditions requiring abandonment occur, whether due to a loss of control room habitability  or a loss of the capability to reach a safe-and-stable state from the control room. i.e., loss of control (Page 3-2)
+*Adding logic in the model to capture when the conditions requiring abandonment occur, whether due to a loss of control room habitability or a loss of the capability to reach a safe-and-stable state from the control room. i.e., loss of control (Page 3-2)
 *Incorporating random failures of equipment required for remote shutdown
 *Model logic for incorporating mitigatable fire-induced failures of equipment required for remote shutdown

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 ===Scope===
-This procedure addresses the following major steps for developing the Fire PRA Model  for calculating CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP for fire events.
+This procedure addresses the following major steps for developing the Fire PRA Model for calculating CDF/CCDP and LERF/CLERP for fire events.
 * Step 1–Develop the Fire PRA CDF/CCDP Model.
 * Step 2–Develop the Fire PRA LERF/CLERP Model.

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 Fire PRA Plant Response Model (PRM)
-==Related EPRI 1011989 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendices==
+==Related EPRI 1011989 / NUREG/CR-6850 Appendices==
 None

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 ===[https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1129/ML112910147.pdf NEI 00-01 Revision 3]===
-**NEI 00-01 Revision 3 documents the MSO Expert Panel Process and provides an updated list of generic MSOs applicable to both PWRs and BWRs.
+*NEI 00-01 Revision 3 documents the MSO Expert Panel Process and provides an updated list of generic MSOs applicable to both PWRs and BWRs.
 ===[https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0917/ML091770265.pdf NEI 00-01 Revision 2]===
-**Revision 2 of NEI 00-01 is endorsed in NRC [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0925/ML092580550.pdf RG 1.189, ''Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants''] Revision 2 October 2009
+*Revision 2 of NEI 00-01 is endorsed in NRC [https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0925/ML092580550.pdf RG 1.189, ''Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants''] Revision 2 October 2009
-**NEI 00-01 documents the MSO Expert Panel Process and provides a list of generic MSOs applicable to both PWRs and BWRs.
+*NEI 00-01 documents the MSO Expert Panel Process and provides a list of generic MSOs applicable to both PWRs and BWRs.
 ===[https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000003002009215/ EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines: Qualitative Guidance for Main Control Room Abandonment Scenarios (NUREG-1921 Supplement 1 / EPRI 3002009215)]===